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Audit Swiftui Sandbox Files

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NOASSERTIONupdated 1mo ago

Let be the absolute plugin directory two levels above this SKILL.md. Resolve that path before running commands or opening shared references. When these instructions say swiftui-ctx, invoke /scripts/swiftui-ctx; do not assume the command is on PATH.

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What can you do with Audit Swiftui Sandbox Files?

name: audit-swiftui-sandbox-files description: Audit macOS SwiftUI sandbox files for correctness, current APIs, and production conventions. Use for that domain or as part of a full audit.

Bundled resource root

Let <swiftui-plugin-root> be the absolute plugin directory two levels above this SKILL.md. Resolve that path before running commands or opening shared references. When these instructions say swiftui-ctx, invoke <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx; do not assume the command is on PATH.

Audit SwiftUI Sandbox & Files

AUDIT-ONLY · macOS-only · SwiftUI-only. Run this on a finished or in-progress macOS SwiftUI project to detect — and where certain, fix — every way file access goes wrong under the App Sandbox: arbitrary-path reads without user consent, a picked URL persisted without a security-scoped bookmark, a start access with no balancing stop, missing entitlement keys, legacy NSItemProvider/UIPasteboard instead of Transferable, the deprecated 3-arg dropDestination, and Hardened-Runtime cs.* gaps. Findings are written to disk in the toolkit's unified schema; certain mechanical defects are fixed under the fix-safety protocol. This is never a from-scratch file-pipeline generator.

The governing rule that makes this domain counter-intuitive — and the reason AI gets it wrong (training data is iOS-shaped, where the app never legitimately touches a path the user didn't already hand it): holding a URL is NOT the same as being allowed to open it. A sandboxed app reaches only its own container plus files the user hands it through a system panel, and that grant does not survive relaunch without a security-scoped bookmark.

Boundary / seam note (stay in lane)

  • The loadTransferable Swift-6 Sendable data race ("Sending main actor-isolated value …") is owned by audit-swiftui-concurrency-safety (the isolation fix: move the picker item + transfer work into an @Observable model). This skill owns only the file-consent angle of the same site; emit a cross_ref: audit-swiftui-concurrency-safety when the isolation hazard is present (sf-07).
  • Whether an NSOpenPanel/NSSavePanel bridge should exist at all is owned by audit-swiftui-appkit-overuse (prefer SwiftUI fileImporter/fileExporter). This skill owns bookmark/consent correctness once a panel or importer is in use; cross_ref it (sf-01, sf-02).
  • The dropDestination(for:action:isTargeted:) deprecation flag is owned by audit-swiftui-api-currency; this skill flags it where it appears in a drag-drop pipeline and cross_refs currency (sf-08).
  • Where the SwiftData store lives (app-group container, store URL) is owned by audit-swiftui-swiftdata; cross_ref it when a bookmark/group-container question is really a store question.
  • The blanket "is every OS-floored API gated" sweep belongs to audit-swiftui-availability-gating; this skill owns the macOS-26 floor of the dropDestination successor in depth and defers the rest.

The three non-negotiable design rules

  1. Files come from the user. A sandboxed app cannot read a path it wasn't granted. Get every URL through fileImporter/fileExporter (SwiftUI) or NSOpenPanel/NSSavePanel (AppKit) — never a hard-coded or user-typed path. Bundle.main resources are the one always-readable exception.
  2. Persistence needs a security-scoped bookmark. To re-open a user file next launch, persist bookmarkData(options: .withSecurityScope) (the Data, not .path); resolve with .withSecurityScope and wrap re-access in ref-counted startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() … stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource() balanced by defer.
  3. Declare every entitlement you use and no more. com.apple.security.app-sandbox plus exactly the capability keys in use (files.user-selected.read-write/.read-only, network.client, app-scope bookmarks). Sandbox-on with a missing key = silent runtime failure, not a compile error.

The consent test: trace each file URL back to its origin — a system panel (fileImporter/NSOpenPanel) or a resolved security-scoped bookmark → granted; a string literal, a URL(fileURLWithPath:), a .path from UserDefaults, or a plain bookmarkData() → ungranted, will fail at runtime. Full reasoning + the round-trip artifact: references/consent-and-bookmarks.md.

Correct (grounded — real shipping code, not a placeholder)

The ✅ for the consent finding (sf-01) is the swiftui-ctx consensus shape for fileImporter (265 repos, 618 uses; top shape (isPresented, allowedContentTypes, allowsMultipleSelection) 65%), shown here as the highest-authority real call site — sindresorhus/Gifski (recommended, bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx file ex_b884986158 --smart):

// ✅ The URL comes from the user through a system panel — granted, survives the call.
// Source: github.com/sindresorhus/Gifski .../Gifski/MainScreen.swift#L26 (min_macos 26, 8.4k★)
.fileImporter(
    isPresented: $appState.isFileImporterPresented,
    allowedContentTypes: Device.supportedVideoTypes
) {
    do { appState.start(try $0.get()) }   // $0: Result<[URL], Error>
    catch { appState.error = error }
}

Contrast the ❌: a String(contentsOf: URL(fileURLWithPath: someHardCodedPath)) — the app holds a URL it was never granted, so the read throws at runtime under the sandbox (sf-01). The fix is to source the URL from the panel above and, to re-open it next launch, persist a .withSecurityScope bookmark (sf-02).

Defect index (sf-01 … sf-09)

id · tell · severity · fix · open reference. Severities: hard-fail (silent runtime failure / won't compile / never-correct on Mac), warning (compiles but breaks under the sandbox), advisory (judgment / distribution). auto = mechanical single-answer fix; flag = show the ✅, dev applies.

id One-line tell Sev Fix Reference
sf-01 String(contentsOf: / Data(contentsOf: / FileManager read-write on a literal or URL(fileURLWithPath:) path, no preceding fileImporter/NSOpenPanel warning flag consent-and-bookmarks.md
sf-02 a picked URL persisted by .path or plain bookmarkData() with no options: .withSecurityScope warning flag consent-and-bookmarks.md
sf-03 startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() with no balancing stopAccessing…/defer (ref-count leak) warning flag consent-and-bookmarks.md
sf-04 file/network/bookmark APIs in use but no .entitlements keys, or com.apple.security.app-sandbox missing on a Mac App Store target warning flag entitlements-and-hardened-runtime.md
sf-05 UIPasteboard referenced in macOS code (absent from native macOS; Mac Catalyst 13.1+ carries it — this skill is native macOS only → won't compile) hard-fail auto transferable-and-clipboard.md
sf-06 NSItemProvider loadObject/loadDataRepresentation or .onDrop(of:) callbacks instead of Transferable + .dropDestination warning flag transferable-and-clipboard.md
sf-07 loadTransferable / .task touching a @MainActor-created picker item (file-consent angle; isolation = concurrency-safety) warning flag transferable-and-clipboard.md
sf-08 dropDestination(for:action:isTargeted:) (3-arg Bool-returning) — deprecated macOS 26.5 advisory flag transferable-and-clipboard.md
sf-09 Developer-ID build that JITs / loads plug-ins / injects, Hardened Runtime off or no com.apple.security.cs.* advisory flag entitlements-and-hardened-runtime.md

Two claims are carried as advisory and never asserted as fact (each flagged in its reference + written source: verify against Xcode 26 SDK): the exact com.apple.security.cs.* Hardened-Runtime entitlement bodies (sf-09, Apple pages not verbatim-captured); and the Xcode-26 Default-Actor-Isolation = Main Actor build setting that can pre-isolate and mask sf-07 (never assume it is on — it is opt-in).

The real API, at a glance

Real (exist on macOS): fileImporter(...) / fileExporter(...) (macOS 11.0+), NSOpenPanel / NSSavePanel / NSPasteboard (AppKit), URL.bookmarkData(options: .withSecurityScope) / URL(resolvingBookmarkData:options:relativeTo:bookmarkDataIsStale:), startAccessingSecurityScopedResource() (macOS 10.10+, ref-counted) / stopAccessingSecurityScopedResource(), Transferable (macOS 13.0+) + .draggable(_:) (macOS 13.0+) / .dropDestination(for:isEnabled:action:) (the macOS-26.0+ successor), CodableRepresentation, entitlement keys com.apple.security.app-sandbox / …files.user-selected.read-write / …files.bookmarks.app-scope / …network.client / com.apple.security.cs.*.

Wrong on Mac / stale: UIPasteboard (absent from native macOS; Mac Catalyst 13.1+ carries it — the clipboard on native macOS is NSPasteboard); dropDestination(for:action:isTargeted:) (the 3-arg Bool-returning form — deprecated macOS 26.5 → dropDestination(for:isEnabled:action:)); persisting a picked URL by .path or a plain bookmarkData() (round-trips the path, not the permission).

Floor values are the reconciled truth in <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/floors-master.md; the canonical platform-wrong/invented-name list is <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/hallucination-blacklist.md — read, never restate them.

The 8-step audit workflow (execute verbatim)

  1. ORIENT. tree / find the SwiftUI sources and every *.entitlements file and Info.plist. Read the deployment target (project.pbxproj MACOSX_DEPLOYMENT_TARGET, or Package.swift platforms:) and whether com.apple.security.app-sandbox is present — both are load-bearing: sf-04 fires on a sandbox-on target missing capability keys; sf-08's successor floor is macOS 26. Record the sandbox state and target.
  2. LOCATE. Run the shared hybrid lint runner: bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-lint.sh --skill audit-swiftui-sandbox-files --dir <sources> --json /tmp/sf.json --sarif /tmp/sf.sarif. It runs this skill's tier-1 grep tells (lint/grep-tells.tsv) + tier-2 structural ast-grep rules (lint/ast-grep/*.yml — the start-without-stop and item-provider-in-onDrop rules grep can't express), plus a per-file parse probe, and emits unified JSON + SARIF. Read its parse_warnings — a flagged file did not fully parse, so a structural miss can't masquerade as clean; READ those by hand. The runner only LOCATES — never treat a hit as a finding. Engine + rule-file format + degradation: <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/lint-architecture.md. The lint scans *.swift; the .entitlements/Info.plist checks (sf-04, sf-09) are read by hand in this step.
  3. READ. Open every located file in full — never pattern-match-and-patch blind. The URL's origin (panel vs literal vs bookmark), the start/stop balance across a function body, and the match between APIs-in-use and entitlement keys are invisible to grep. Build a per-file inventory: each file URL + its origin (consent test) + its persistence (bookmark or .path) + its start/stop balance.
  4. DETECT. Apply the index. Assign each candidate a confidence; report a finding only at 100% certainty (e.g. a UIPasteboard on Mac, a String(contentsOf:) on a literal path with no panel, a .path persistence, a bookmarkData() with no .withSecurityScope). For sf-07, if the loadTransferable site also carries an isolation hazard, set cross_ref: audit-swiftui-concurrency-safety.
  5. VERIFY. For anything ≤ ~70% confidence (a symbol you're unsure exists, a floor you can't place, an entitlement string, a deprecation), run both evidence sources. (a) Practice — bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx lookup <api> --json (and bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx deprecated <api> for sf-08): read its consensus (the canonical shape), deprecated+replacement, recommended permalink, introduced_macos, and co_occurs_with; a lookup exit 3 (not-found, with a did-you-mean suggestion) corroborates a platform-wrong/hallucination finding — no shipping Mac app uses the symbol. (b) Spec — confirm via Sosumi: curl -sSL https://sosumi.ai/<apple-path> using references/source-directory.md for the path and <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/sosumi-reference.md for the protocol (never WebFetch developer.apple.com). Cross-check introduced_macos against floors-master.md and the Sosumi doc: floor. The CLI contract is <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/swiftui-ctx-reference.md. When the corpus and floors-master disagree, floors-master wins — the catalog predates the macOS-26.5 doc and reports dropDestination as not-deprecated, but floors-master records the 26.5 deprecation; carry it as fact and note the lag. Promote with the citation or discard. Carry the two UNVERIFIED items as advisory with source: verify against Xcode 26 SDK — never as fact.
  6. REPORT. Write each confirmed finding (output contract below). One finding per file, zero-padded, ordered. Write the run's _index.md.
  7. FIX. Apply corrections under the fix-safety protocol (<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/fix-safety-protocol.md): clean-tree gate, findings-first, only fix_mode: auto (sf-05 UIPasteboard → NSPasteboard), one conventional commit per finding citing its rule_id, never weaken a check. The ✅ "Correct" is not a hand-written snippet — it is the swiftui-ctx consensus shape put in ## Correct, backed by a real macOS-26 example fetched with bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx file <recommended.id> --smart whose GitHub permalink (plus the Sosumi doc:) goes in ## Source as the canonical example. For the consent finding (sf-01), the corpus recommended for fileImporter is sindresorhus/Gifski (bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-ctx file ex_b884986158 --smart). Leave flag-only findings open with that ✅ in ## Correct.
  8. DOUBLE-CHECK. Re-grep each fixed file to confirm the tell no longer matches; record the evidence in ## Fix applied?. Re-confirm every citation still resolves and still says the recorded floor. If a fix introduced a new tell (e.g. a fileImporter you added now needs a files.user-selected entitlement), loop that file back to DETECT.

Confidence gating (load-bearing)

Report a finding only at 100% certainty. Anything ≤ ~70% goes to VERIFY (step 5) before it can become a finding — never emit a speculative finding. Auto-fix only the mechanical set (sf-05 UIPasteboard → NSPasteboard); every entitlement/consent/bookmark fix is fix_mode: flag-only because it depends on the app's distribution model and the panel wiring (never blindly add an entitlement).

Output contract

Inherits the toolkit's unified contract (full schema + body sections + frontmatter keys: <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/finding-schema.md — do not restate it). Specialized for this domain:

  • Findings: swiftui-audits/sandbox-files/<context>/NN-slug.md (one finding per file, zero-padded, ordered). Per-run index: swiftui-audits/sandbox-files/_index.md.
  • domain: sandbox-files. Frontmatter is the canonical schema; fix_mode is auto for sf-05, else flag-only. availability reads from floors-master.md. source is an Apple URL + access date (fetched via Sosumi) or verify against Xcode 26 SDK. Emit cross_ref per the boundary note (concurrency-safety for sf-07, appkit-overuse for sf-01/02 panels, api-currency for sf-08, swiftdata for store-location bookmarks).

Starter <context> folders (file here when…):

<context> File a finding here when…
arbitrary-path-read/ a file is read/written from a literal or user-typed path with no panel consent (sf-01)
security-scoped-bookmarks/ a picked URL is persisted by .path/plain bookmark, or start has no balancing stop (sf-02, sf-03)
entitlements/ sandbox-on with missing capability keys, or app-sandbox missing on a store target (sf-04)
transferable-drag-drop/ legacy NSItemProvider/onDrop, the loadTransferable consent angle, or the deprecated dropDestination (sf-06, sf-07, sf-08)
clipboard/ UIPasteboard on Mac → NSPasteboard (sf-05)
hardened-runtime/ a Developer-ID JIT/plug-in/inject build needs com.apple.security.cs.* (sf-09)

New-folder rule: if a finding does not fit any existing context folder, create a new one under swiftui-audits/sandbox-files/ with a lowercase-hyphen slug naming the sub-category, and note it in the run's _index.md. Prefer an existing folder when the fit is reasonable; consistency across runs is a hard requirement. Two runs over the same code produce structurally identical trees.

Go-beyond artifact (optional): swiftui-audits/sandbox-files/_consent-map.md tracing every file URL to its origin (panel / bookmark / literal) with a consent-coverage score — see references/consent-and-bookmarks.md.

Reference routing

File Open when
references/consent-and-bookmarks.md a consent/persistence question — the literal-path trap, the security-scoped-bookmark round-trip, the start/stop ref-count balance, the stale-bookmark re-create, the consent map (sf-01/02/03)
references/entitlements-and-hardened-runtime.md the entitlement keys you must declare per API, the sandbox ON-vs-OFF fork, and the Hardened-Runtime com.apple.security.cs.* exceptions (sf-04/09)
references/transferable-and-clipboard.md drag-drop modernization (NSItemProvider/onDrop → Transferable + .dropDestination), the loadTransferable consent seam, the deprecated 3-arg dropDestination, and NSPasteboard vs UIPasteboard (sf-05/06/07/08)
references/source-directory.md step VERIFY — the Apple/practitioner source map fetched via Sosumi
lint/grep-tells.tsv + lint/ast-grep/*.yml step LOCATE — this skill's declarative lint rule set fed to the shared runner (tier-1 grep tells + tier-2 structural ast-grep); edit here to tune detection

Shared toolkit references (point in, never restate):

Shared file For
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/floors-master.md every floor/availability value (the reconciled truth — incl. the dropDestination 26.5 deprecation)
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/hallucination-blacklist.md the canonical platform-wrong/invented-name list
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/macos-arm-gating.md the macOS-arm gating rule (the dropDestination successor's macOS-26 floor)
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/finding-schema.md the unified finding schema + frontmatter keys
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/fix-safety-protocol.md the 8-point fix-safety protocol (step 7)
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/sosumi-reference.md the Apple-doc spec fetch protocol (step 5 VERIFY)
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/swiftui-ctx-reference.md the practice-corpus CLI contract — lookup/deprecated/file --smart for the consensus shape + permalinked example (steps 5 VERIFY · 7 FIX)
<swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/cross-ref-graph.md seam ownership + cross_ref targets (concurrency-safety · appkit-overuse · api-currency · swiftdata)

Detection accelerator

bash <swiftui-plugin-root>/scripts/swiftui-lint.sh --skill audit-swiftui-sandbox-files --dir <files-or-dir> [--json out.json] [--sarif out.sarif] — the toolkit's one shared hybrid lint engine, fed this skill's declarative rules: tier-1 grep tells (lint/grep-tells.tsv, sf-01/02/04/05/06/07/08/09 flat presence) + tier-2 ast-grep structural rules (lint/ast-grep/*.yml — sf-03 start with no balancing stop in the same function, sf-06 NSItemProvider.load* inside an .onDrop closure) that grep cannot express. It runs a per-file parse probe (surfaces "did not fully parse" so a structural miss can't look clean), emits unified JSON + SARIF, exits 2 on any hard-fail (sf-05) for a CI gate, and degrades to grep-only with a notice if ast-grep is unreachable (npx --package @ast-grep/cli ast-grep; faster: brew install ast-grep). It only LOCATES — always READ each hit in full before reporting (step 3), and read the .entitlements/Info.plist by hand (the lint is *.swift-only). The thin scripts/sandbox-lint.sh is a pointer to this runner. Engine + rule-file format + JSON/SARIF shape + safety rails: <swiftui-plugin-root>/references/_shared/lint-architecture.md.